

**POLS 535**  
**Formal Modeling and Political Analysis II**

**Spring 2021**

Class Schedule: Monday 8:40 – 11:30,  
Zoom link: <https://sabanciuniv.zoom.us/j/94942210264>

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**Course Description:**

There are two goals of this course: One is to prepare you to think about your own theoretical questions with formal models. The second is to familiarize you with game theoretic models in the field of political science.

In order to achieve these goals, we will cover (i) selected chapters of McCarty and Meirowitz and (ii) some political science papers that use formal models. The chapters will be on social choice, cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining, static and dynamic games with incomplete information, cheap talk, repeated games, behavioral political science and experimental game theory. We tried to choose papers that cover interesting topics (such as behavioral politics, ethnicity, elections, and the EU) and that use tools that we learned or will learn in the first part of the course.

This course assumes prior knowledge of basic game theoretic tools (such as those taught in POLS 534 or any other comparable course). You will need to know about concepts such as rationality, domination, Nash equilibrium, or subgame perfect equilibrium but you do not need to know about games of incomplete information.

**Requirements:**

**Participation: (10%)** In each class we are going to go through examples or solutions of the models in the book or assigned papers. You are expected to read the assignments before class so that you will either have questions that will be clarified in class or you will be able to participate when we are working on examples.

**Problem Sets: (20%)** The problem sets will be due in one or two weeks. You can (and are encouraged) to work on the problem sets together, but everyone is required to turn in his or her own separate answer.

**Paper: (40%)** We will provide more information later in the semester.

Presentation: (30%) You will do a presentation of your paper in the last two weeks of the class. You will also present a political science paper from the list below.

**Book:** McCarthy, Nolan and Adam Meirowitz (2007) *Political Game Theory: An Introduction*. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.)

### **Topics and Readings (Tentative):**

#### 1. Social Choice

McCarthy & Meirowitz Chapter 4

#### 2. Cooperative Bargaining Games

McCarthy & Meirowitz, Chapter 10.1

Kibris, Ozgur. 2010. "Cooperative Game Theory Approaches to Negotiation" in *Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation*. eds. Marc Kilgour and Colin Eden.

#### 3. Non-cooperative Bargaining Games

McCarthy & Meirowitz, Chapter 10.1-4

Baron, David P. and John A. Ferejohn. (1989) "Bargaining in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 89: 1181-1206

Powell (2002), "Bargaining theory and international conflict", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5:1, 30-61.

Yildirim, Huseyin. "Distribution of Surplus in Sequential Bargaining with Endogenous Recognition," *Public Choice*, 142 (2010), pp. 41-57.

#### 4. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

McCarthy & Meirowitz Chapter 6

#### 5. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Costly Signaling

McCarthy & Meirowitz Chapter 8, sections 1-5

Spence, Michael. 1973 "Job Market Signaling." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 87(3): 355-374.

## 6. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Costly Signaling

Epstein, David and Peter Zemsky. 1995 “Money Talks: Deterring Quality Challengers in Congressional Elections” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 295-308

## 7. Cheap Talk

Gibbons, Robert. 1992 *Game Theory for Applied Economists*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pp. 210-218

Epstein, David. 1997 “An informational rationale for committee gatekeeping power” *Public Choice*. 91: 271–299

## 8. Repeated Games

McCarthy & Meirowitz Chapter 9

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. (1996) “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.” *American Political Science Review* 90(4): 715-735.

## Papers

GRAHAM, M., & SVOLIK, M. (2020). Democracy in America? Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in the United States. *American Political Science Review*, 114(2), 392-409. doi:10.1017/S0003055420000052

Boix, Carles and Milan W. Svobik (2013) “The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 75, No. 2, April 2013, Pp. 300–316

Stokes, S. (2005) ‘Perverse accountability: a formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina’, *American Political Science Review*, 99, 3: 315- 327.

Stokes, Susan, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. (2013) *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3

Gans Morse, Jordan, Sebastina Mazzuca and Simean Nichter (2014) “Varieties of Clientelism Machine Politics During Elections” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 58, No. 2, April 2014, Pp. 415–432

Gingerich, D. W. and Medina, L. F. (2013), The Endurance and Eclipse of the Controlled Vote: A Formal Model of Vote Brokerage Under the Secret Ballot. *Economics & Politics*, 25: 453–480. doi: 10.1111/ecpo.12020

Schnellenbach, J., & Schubert, C. (2015). Behavioral political economy: A survey. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 40, 395-417.  
(you can choose to present only one section of this paper, with a particular emphasis on one of the reviewed articles)

Aarøe, L., Petersen, M. B., & Arceneaux, K. (2017). The behavioral immune system shapes political intuitions: Why and how individual differences in disgust sensitivity underlie opposition to immigration. *The American Political Science Review*, 111(2), 277.

Little, A. T. (2019). The distortion of related beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(3), 675-689.

Horz, C. M. (2021). Propaganda and skepticism. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Kibris, A. (2020) Exposure to Political Violence and Intimate Partner Abuse: A Natural Experiment

Kibris, A. And Uler N. (2021) The Impact of Exposure to Political Violence On Risk and Ambiguity Attitudes